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I. INTRODUCTION
The end of President George W. Bush’s final year in office marked the end
of the ‘ownership society’ policy program he championed at the end of his first
term.1 The implosion of the secondary mortgage market has occasioned more
than one obituary for this economic and civic ideal.2
Broad-based
homeownership and participation in securities markets were supposed to
promote greater economic engagement and empower the American middle
class to build wealth.3 The dream of owning the place where you lived
resonated with images of pride, security and, over much of the last decade or
two, year-after-year of double-digit investment appreciation. Far from being
daunted by turn-of-the-millennium stock market sputterings, American
investors, large and small, doubled-down and increased their real estate
holdings through larger and more complex forms of leveraging.4
It is ironic that the newly christened ‘ownership society’ should run
aground because of irrational exuberance in home buying rather than in stock
speculation. Ownership of one’s own place in the world truly can offer the
basis for community stakeholder status that those championing the ownership
society claimed for all manner of financial investments. 5 Home is all about
stability. For more than fifty years, Americans have looked to their homes for
stability in wealth as well as security of residential tenure. The emphasis over
the last decade, on the home as source of money, however, has displaced the
in-kind benefits of homeownership and ultimately put them at risk.
In the midst of this crisis in our understanding of homeownership, the
movement to create a stock of permanently affordable homes poses a stark sign
of contradiction. During the last four decades, inclusionary zoning programs
and Community Land Trusts (CLTs) have created and sustained homes that are
affordable to not only the original low or moderate-income households that

1. See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet:
America’s Ownership Society: Expanding Opportunities (Aug. 9, 2004), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809-9.html.
2. See, e.g., Jo Becker, Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Stephen Labaton, White House Philosophy
Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at 1, 36, Zachary Karabell, End of the
‘Ownership Society,’ NEWSWEEK, Oct. 20, 2008, at 39.
3. See DEAN BAKER, PLUNDER AND BLUNDER: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BUBBLE
ECONOMY 20, 84–85 (2008) (arguing that Federal government policy encouraging middle class
speculative investment extends back to the Clinton Administration).
4. See generally DANIEL MCGINN, HOUSE LUST: AMERICA’S OBSESSION WITH OUR
HOMES (2008).
5. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property As Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1939–41 (2005);
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the Castle, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2971, 2972–75 (2006) (contrasting two understandings of the “home as a
castle” metaphor: “despotic dominion” and “inherent dignity.” Only the latter, he argues, reflects
the proper balance of private and public needs with regard to land). See also infra Part II.A.
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move into them, but also to succeeding generations of income-qualified
homebuyers as well. While a general desire to make the tenure benefits of
homeownership more generally available has encouraged these efforts, three
different types of housing emergencies have necessitated the development of
these long-term strategies for creating and sustaining permanently affordable
homes.
First, inclusionary zoning programs designed to address
socioeconomic inequities in the creation of new residential subdivisions have
created resale-restricted homeownership units.6 Second, urban neighborhood
CLTs have fought the displacement brought on by gentrification by preserving
the affordability of low-income equity cooperatives and other affordable
homes.7 Third, smaller cities and towns have used CLTs to create a stock of
perpetually affordable single-family homes throughout their communities.8
Some metropolitan housing markets have become so thoroughly
unaffordable that communities cannot offer conveniently located homes for
teachers, police officers, nurses or other essential professional and nonprofessional workers. While land use and housing subsidy policies that
support multi-family rental projects are an important part of the local
affordable housing response, affordable single-family homes must be available
if theses communities wish to complete the workforce housing picture.
In Montgomery County, Maryland, local officials harnessed a burgeoning
private housing industry in the region and put it to work to build affordable
homes both for rental and ownership. In 1973, the local government instituted
an inclusionary zoning system that required new housing developments of a
certain density and size to include a small percentage of homes to be made
available at below-market rates.9 This Moderately-Priced Dwelling Unit
(MPDU) program not only created affordable homeownership opportunities
but provided for their continued affordability.10 Rental units were required to
be kept affordable for a period of twenty years, but it was not just landlords
that were subject to affordability controls.11 Homeownership units were also
protected.12 Homeowners promised when they chose to move, they would
make their homes available to other income-qualified households.13

6. See infra text accompanying notes 10–14.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 15–16.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 17–19.
9. See Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and
Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 877, 914–15 (2006); Montgomery County Dep’t of
Hous. and Cmty. Affairs, History of the MPDU Program in Montgomery County,
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/dhctmpl.asp?url=/content/dhca/housing/housing_P/mpdu/
history.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Montgomery County].
10. See Orfield, supra note 9, at 914–18; Montgomery County, supra note 9.
11. Orfield, supra note 9, at 915.
12. Homeowners buying these subsidized units make two types of enforceable promises
designed to ensure the future affordability of housing. First, they place a mortgage on the
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In smaller, more community-based settings, housing advocates have used
these same subsidy retention devices to sustain affordable homes built by nonprofit housing developers. Twenty years ago, the then-fledgling Dudley Street
Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) wanted to secure the permanence of the gains
for which they were struggling and planning in their Boston neighborhood of
Roxbury. Residents had witnessed the displacement and human devastation
that urban renewal and gentrification had inflicted on nearby low-income
communities.14 They wanted to revitalize their disinvested neighborhood
without being forced out by skyrocketing land values. In August 1988, they
formed Dudley Neighbors, Inc., a community land trust that would hold title to
the land underneath all the affordable housing and community space that DSNI
was fighting to create.15
Outside the metropolitan context, smaller, more isolated cities and towns
with high land values and low wage bases have turned to the CLT model as a
means of creating and sustaining economically diverse communities of choice.
In Rochester, Minnesota, the Mayo Clinic sponsored the creation of the First
Homes CLT to increase the homeownership opportunities available to a
broader range of that area’s residents.16 Resort areas such as the Florida Keys
and Jackson Hole, Wyoming have also seen the creation of these long-term
stewards of non-profit homes.17
Whether these homes are subsidized through exactions from developers (as
with the inclusionary housing programs) or through public and private capital
(as with CLTs), they are sustained through the legal arrangements made with
homeowners that uniquely define the parameters of permanently affordable

property that covers the difference between the home’s market price and the price they paid for it.
This mortgage does not require any payments while the owner lives in the home and is released if
the second promise is kept. Subsidized homeowners can stay in the homes as long as they want
but promise to pass their good deals on to another generation of qualifying households when they
decide it is time to sell. They promise to sell the property to the MPDU program itself or a family
approved by it. More importantly, they agree to sell it at a price calculated to give them fair
return on their investment without putting the home out of reach for similarly situated
homebuyers. See Montgomery County, supra note 9.
13. See id. (explaining that at first, the MPDU ordinance’s resale control period was only 5
years, then in 1981, the resale period was extended prospectively to 10 years and that as of April
2005, new MPDU homeownership units are subject to resale restrictions for 30 years).
14. ELISE M. BRIGHT, REVITALIZING AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN NEIGHBORHOODS: AN
INVESTIGATION OF INNER CITY REVITALIZATION EFFORTS 77–78 (2000); PETER MEDOFF &
HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD 17–23
(1994).
15. BRIGHT, supra note 14, at 81–82; MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 14, at 126–27.
16. First Homes: Rochester Area Found. Cmty. Land Trust (CLT), http://www.first
homes.org/hot.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
17. Jackson Hole Cmty. Hous. Trust, http://www.housingtrustjh.org (last visited Sept. 12,
2009); Middle Keys Cmty. Land Trust, http://www.mkclt.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
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homeownership.18 In so doing, they offer a new take on the “ownership
society,” one that challenges conventional social and legal notions of property
in land. By sharing the equity appreciation attributable to the continuing
vitality of the surrounding community, participating homeowners enjoy the full
in-kind benefits of homeownership and a stable, albeit capped, return on their
financial investments.
Even in the context of owning one’s own residence, the legal
understanding of ownership has long embraced the right to no longer own—
that is, the right to sell. The link forged between ownership and unfettered
alienability brought down feudalism in the West and spawned a number of
legal doctrines that continue to plague many first-year law students partial to
the simplicity of freedom to contract. The Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP)
invalidates contingent future interests that do not vest by the rule’s deadline.19
Even if resale restrictions do not trigger this limited, but strict, prohibition,
they must contend with a more nebulous common-law review as to the
reasonability of restraints on alienation generally.20
All of these organizations have placed subsidies into homes to benefit not
only the original qualified homebuyers but successive generations of low and
moderate-income households as well. They sustain the affordability of
homeownership in their communities not merely by collecting the subsidy
back from sponsored households when they sell but also by ensuring that those
subsidies can remain at those particular locations. This dedication of specific
parcels to perpetually affordable homeownership requires legally enforceable
controls over who can purchase those properties and at what price.
Several legal mechanisms control resales of subsidized homes so as to
preserve affordability while still providing all aspects of ownership to the
subsidized homeowner including a fair return on the homeowner’s own
monetary investment.21 An argument could be made that, given the broad
18. Even in sustaining the long-term affordability of homes, CLT and IZ programs have
differed in approach. Compare David M. Abromowitz, CLTs and Ground Leases, 1 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 5, 5–6 (1992) (stating CLTs have generally maintained an
ongoing reversionary interest in the land upon which the affordable homes are built), with INST.
FOR CMTY. ECON., COMMUNITY LAND TRUST LEGAL MANUAL (2d ed. 2002) (stating
inclusionary zoning programs generally use covenants accompanying the deed to embody the
subsidized homeowners’ resale promises. CLTs put these same provisions into a lease which
gives the homeowner a 99-year term).
19. Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1867, 1868 (1986)
(quoting J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 19 (4th ed. 1942)) (“We start with
Gray’s classic statement of the Rule: ‘No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later
than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.’”).
20. See generally 3 JOHN A. BORRON, JR., SIMES & SMITH: THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
§§ 1111–1172 (3d ed. 2004) (explaining the rules restricting the creation of future interests
including disabling restraints and forfeiture restraints).
21. Id. §§ 1111–1117, 1131. See also discussion infra Parts III.A.1–2.
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public policy considerations supporting affordable homeownership resale
restrictions, statutes should be passed that make private or public permanent
dedications of land to affordable homeownership beyond the reach of outdated
doctrines of alienability.22 I will try to show in this Article, however, that the
legal approach that made the market economy in land possible can, through
moderate deference to the goals of permanent affordability, encourage a more
nuanced approach to permanent affordability that is healthier and more
sustainable than more simplistic approaches. Specifically, the conventional
doctrinal hostility to “dead hand control” of land pushes those creating
permanently affordable homes to provide for stewarding entities that will not
merely enforce restrictions as originally written but also apply basic principles
to make necessary adjustments to resale policies and ultimately act as a
guarantor against fractionated title.
This independent stewardship entity approach to resale control must be
distinguished from three other alternatives. First, private dedications of land to
a social purpose threatened by market activity often stress permanence and
inviolability to the total exclusion of flexibility. Statutorily authorized
conservation easements offer an example of, what I will call, the “lockbox”
approach to land protection.23 An irrevocable decision is made to limit
development of the land forever. Second, the enactment of a particular set of
resale restrictions on land can come directly from publicly enacted statutes and
regulations. This command-and-control mode of protecting the affordability of
subsidized homes offers a high-level certainty of enforceability, but also raises
concerns about the responsiveness of its enacted resale procedures to changing
circumstances and individual situations.24 A third affordability protection
alternative places the restrictions neither in the estate of the homeowner nor in
public statutes and ordinances but in the development documents that create
the community of which the affordable home is a part.25 This placement of
stewardship authority, if not sole responsibility for protecting affordability,
with a party that has landed interest is a significant step to the independent
stewardship entity alternative that is the focus of the Article’s final Part.
Both inclusionary zoning programs and CLTs are developing legal
arrangements that balance responsiveness to changing circumstances with an
immoveable commitment to the goods offered by permanently affordable
homeownership. At the core of these arrangements is a single legal device that
embodies the essential facets of the stewardship approach to permanent

22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.3.
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affordability: the pre-emptive option.26 Whether contained in an inclusionary
zoning covenant or in a CLT ground lease, the inclusion of a pre-emptive
option provides affordability stewards with an assignable right of first refusal
on any attempt by the homeowner to sell the property.27 Most importantly, this
ability to have the first opportunity to buy the property when the homeowner
sells includes an agreement between the affordability steward and the
homeowner as to the sale price.28
As a restriction of the resale of real property, the pre-emptive option must
contend with legal doctrines that are hostile to both perpetuities and alienation
restraints. Because the pre-emptive option, used to preserve long-term
affordability, can affect a sale many decades after its creation, a lawyer who
uses the device must be wary of the RAP.29 Since this type of right of first
refusal acts to limit both the price and potential buyers for a property, it should
be drafted to avoid any law, statutory or judge-made, that invalidates
suspensions of or unreasonable restraints on alienation.30 As will be discussed
further, the pre-emptive option responds to these challenges better than more
direct restraints, public or private, on a homeowner’s right to sell because it
provides for the continuing re-assertion of the steward’s relationship to the
property.31
Part II will articulate the goal of permanently affordable homeownership
and set out the criteria for evaluating different resale restriction devices to
achieve it. Part III will begin by articulating the reasons why a stewardship
approach to restricting resale is superior to testamentary or regulatory
approaches to sustaining the affordability of subsidized homes. Part III will
examine the pre-emptive option as the legal device of the stewardship
approach and how it facilitates permanently affordable homeownership in a
legal environment still hostile to long-term alienation restrictions that do not
benefit particular landowners. Part IV concludes with an examination of how
the IZ and CLT using pre-emptive options in covenants and leases
respectively.

26. See infra Part III.B.3 (stating that the pre-emptive option is a right of first refusal that
specifies the price at which the option holder can buy the property).
27. Abromowitz, supra note 18, at 6; INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., supra note 18, at 12-11–1213, 13-18–13-25; Moderately Priced Dwelling Units Declaration of Covenants For Sale
Subdivisions, Art. II, http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/dhca/housing/housing_P/
mpdu/pdf/covenants_mpdu_sale_8-9-06.pdf [hereinafter Moderately Priced Dwelling Units].
28. Abromowitz, supra note 18, at 6; INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., supra note 18, at 12-11–1213, 13-18–13-25; Moderately Priced Dwelling Units, supra note 27, at art. II.
29. See infra Part III.A.2. See also BORRON, JR., supra note 20, § 1222 (stating the RAP).
30. See infra Part III.A.1. See also BORRON, JR., supra note 20, §§ 1111–12 (discussing
what is a restraint on alienation).
31. See infra Part III.C.
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II. DEDICATION OF LAND TO PERMANENTLY AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP
A.

Why? The Goods of Homeownership

Homeownership offers stability both in place and in wealth. Socially, the
stability of tenure associated with fee simple ownership of land forms a
foundation for the household and the participation of its members in their
immediate and larger communities. Economically, the home, invariably its
owner’s principal asset, is a tax-smart, conservative investment structured to
encourage automatic saving. Far from competing with one another, the
economic and social aspects of stability fostered by homeownership
complement each other strongly. Although both the economic and social
goods of homeownership are, to some extent, fortified by the ability of resident
owners to buy and sell properties freely, the stability in tenure and wealth
available through homeownership flows from durable rights to quiet enjoyment
rather than its open-ended potential to yield a liquid cash return.
Socially, the stability of tenure associated with fee simple ownership of
land forms a foundation for the household and the participation of its members
in their immediate and larger communities. Proponents of expanding
homeownership have argued that homeowners benefit from improved physical
and psychological health and provide better educational environments for
children in their households. For decades, scholars have argued that
homeowners have improved self-esteem and life satisfaction.32 Home
purchase often involves the successful completion of financial goals. The
recognition of these accomplishments by self and others would seem to
contribute to self-esteem. Even so, studies have not generally been able to
demonstrate statistically significant increases in self-esteem that can
specifically be attributed to homeownership.33 The correlation between
homeownership and positive educational outcomes has been more promising
even when controlling for a variety of other factors.34 These personal and

32. William M. Rohe et al., Social Benefits and Costs of Homeownership, in LOW-INCOME
HOMEOWNERSHIP: EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL 381, 386 (Nicholas P. Retsinas & Eric
S. Belsky eds., 2002) (quoting Robert M. Rakoff, Ideology in Everyday Life: The Meaning of the
House, 7 POL. & SOC’Y 85, 93 (1977)) [hereinafter Rohe et al., Social Benefits]. See generally
William M. Rohe & Michael A. Stegman, The Effects of Homeownership: On the Self-Esteem,
Perceived Control and Life Satisfaction of Low-Income People, 60 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 173
(1994) [hereinafter Rohe & Stegman, Effects of Homeownership].
33. Rohe et. al, Social Benefits, supra note 32, at 386; Rohe & Stegman, Effects of
Homeownership, supra note 32, at 180–81. Interestingly, improved physical health outcomes,
although modest, are somewhat easier to demonstrate. Rohe et al., Social Benefits, supra note 32,
at 388–89.
34. Rohe et al., Social Benefits, supra note 32, at 398–99; Donald R. Haurin et al., Impact of
Homeownership on Child Outcomes, in LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP: EXAMINING THE
UNEXAMINED GOAL, supra note 32, at 427, 429–440 (Nicholas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds.,
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household gains have spillover effects for the immediate and larger
communities.35 There is reason to believe that happier and more self-confident
household members will be more productive; this multiplication effect is even
more evident with higher educational attainment.36
Increased homeownership has more direct social benefits for
neighborhoods, metropolitan areas and beyond. The strength of communities,
both large and, in particular, small, depend on the level of engagement by their
members. Homeowners have consistently made up a disproportionately large
share of those participating in neighborhood organizations and local political
activities.37 Because the values of their homes depend so greatly on the
desirability of the neighborhoods in which they live, local issues dealing with
crime, schools and municipal services have financial impacts that incentivize
homeowners to pay attention to them.38 More interestingly, the increased
attachment a homeowner has to his or her current place, both from the
increased costs associated with moving as well as the security of tenure, fosters
greater social involvement.39 Community tenure (that is, the hold that a
resident has on his or her membership in his or her geographic community)
encourages social involvement apart from the individualized financial return
coming from public goods.40 The social capital that communities, both large
and small, gain from homeownership comes from social and economic causes.
The move from renter to homeowner status is not completely without risks,
especially for low and moderate-income households. Both the social and
economic benefits of homeownership can be displaced completely by costs
associated with mortgage default and foreclosure. Although a tenant
experiencing eviction can suffer loss of personal property and a security
deposit, as well as damage to his or her credit rating, these harms can each be
magnified for the homeowner facing the loss of investment and residence
through foreclosure.
Even the positive health effects attributed to
homeownership can give way to negative health outcomes caused by the stress
of missed mortgage payments and foreclosure proceedings. In financially
desperate circumstances, a homeowner may have more leverage, resources,
and, most importantly, time to respond to the imminent loss of the home and

2002). See generally Thomas P. Boehm & Alan M. Schlottman, Does Home Ownership By
Parents Have an Economic Impact on Their Children?, 8 J. HOUSING ECON. 217 (1999).
35. Rohe et al., Social Benefits, supra note 32, at 400.
36. Id. at 390, 397.
37. Id. at 395–96.
38. Id. at 395.
39. Id. at 393–94.
40. See infra Part II.B. (discussing how this disentanglement of security of tenure from
homeowner equity appreciation helps us appreciate how a limited equity form of homeownership
can still encourage social investment by the homeowner).
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can manage relocation than a similarly situated renter.41 While the dream of
homeownership can, and for many recently has, become a financial nightmare,
the increased security of tenure can have positive effects in difficult times as
well.
Many of the economic and social benefits of homeownership, both to
homeowners and their communities, can be more precisely tied to the home as
a financial investment. The dependence of the home’s value on factors related
to the community as a whole frequently draws the owner out of his or her
castle to engage in collaborative activities that benefit all.42 It is difficult,
however, to isolate this financial motivation for community involvement for
the in-kind benefits the homeowner as a community member derives from an
improved neighborhood and even from the participatory activities themselves.
Nevertheless, with expanding homeownership opportunities through public
subsidies, it is quite useful to understand more thoroughly how subsidy
policies that offer both financial return and security of tenure in residential
housing differ from those that offer less of the other or of both. Before turning
to the different kinds of homeownership subsidies, I will discuss another
possible gain from homeownership subsidy, one critically relevant to the study
of long-term resale restrictions: economic diversity among residents of a
community.
By supporting first-time home purchases by persons who would otherwise
be unable to become homeowners, subsidy providers increase the number of
people able to become homeowners generally. Even when such subsidies go to
persons who could buy a home, albeit a less expensive one, some of the social
and economic benefits can be amplified by increasing the home and
neighborhood choices available to them. Both subsidy strategies usually
increase the economic diversity, at least as to homeowners, of the communities
these new homeowners join.43 The economic range of homeowners in such
In
neighborhoods expands however slightly on the bottom end.44
neighborhoods with very high homeownership rates, these additions will often
increase the economic diversity of the neighborhood residents generally.45
Even when renters receive a subsidy to buy a home in the area in which they

41. See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home,
107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1100 (2009).
42. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW U. L. REV. 1047 (2008)
(pointing out that this dynamic is not always socially positive; the economic vulnerability
homeowners have to local social and economic factors can create a heightened sense of anxiety in
local politics that encourages insularity and even bigotry).
43. Orfield, supra note 9, at 915–16.
44. Id. at 910.
45. Id. at 917.
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were already living, their assisted move to homeownership changes marginally
the economic character of that community.46
Economic diversity within communities has received greater attention in
the last two decades as scholars of persistent poverty have turned their
attention to the extreme concentration of poor people, especially AfricanAmerican poor people, that suburbanization has created in America’s inner
cities.47 Although the policy recommendations that have flowed from such
research have understandably focused on the strategic use of rental housing
subsidies, homeownership subsidies also can be deployed to gain and secure
the social benefits of greater economic diversity in neighborhoods and
regions.48 The CLTs and inclusionary zoning programs that employ resale
restrictions use housing subsidies in just this way. As noted earlier, these
community development tools have been particularly attractive to communities
that would exclude important segments of the population from local
homeownership or from residency altogether if not for long-term planning in
the placement of subsidies.49
Resale restrictions secure these economic diversity objectives of placebased homeownership subsidy. Before discussing how long-term controls on
the transfer of privately owned homes balance these community goals with the
other benefits that homeownership offers, it is worthwhile setting out the
general categories of homeownership subsidies.
B.

Shared Equity Resident-Owned Housing as Achieving These Goods

Subsidies, whether funded directly by taxpayers in government
investments or indirectly through grants and loans offered by private
nonprofits, supplement market forces to create opportunities not available
through the conventional workings of supply and demand. Housing subsidies
can work on the demand side of the transaction or through its supply aspect.
Demand-side subsidies, in the home purchase context, usually involve down
payment and closing cost assistance.50 Homebuyers receive a pledge of

46. See id. at 893.
47. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 51–55 (1993); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON,
THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987);
PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE AMERICAN CITY
(1997).
48. Orfield, supra note 9, at 931.
49. See supra Part II.A.
50. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Toward a Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming a Long History of
Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459, 504 (2007). See also
Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis In Affordable Housing: Systemic Issues Requiring
Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 475 (2004) (referring to Individual Development
Accounts as subsidized savings program in which funds can be used for home purchase).
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assistance and then go out into the market, find a home and purchase it at the
market price using the financial help provided to close the affordability gap.51
Supply-side support for low and moderate-income homeownership generally
involves public funding for the creation of new and rehabilitated housing units
that are sold at below-market prices to qualified buyers.52 Both demand and
supply subsidies can support the financial and tenure security benefits of
homeownership. How heavily they both promote the former type of benefits
may depend on the generosity of the recapture policy of the subsidy provider.53
Most significant subsidies have to be paid back by the homeowner when the
home is sold, but many such recapture provisions allow for the homeowner to
retain the subsidy as cash if the homeowner has occupied the property for a
certain number of years.54
Examining the goods offered by homeownership subsidies, we see that
many of these goods can be offered by both demand subsidies and supply
subsidies. Likewise, within supply subsidies, the personal and broader
community advantages offered by demand subsidies can be promoted through
all manner of supply subsidies. However, the goods associated with sustained
economic diversity are best secured through subsidy retention rather than
subsidy recapture devices.55
The goods of ‘Home as Place’ and ‘Home as Investment’ find themselves
in tension in situations where land values have made ownership of an even a
modest home unaffordable to median income households in the community. In
the regional context, workers that are vital to serving the needs of local
residents are forced to live on the outer fringe of the metropolitan regions far
from their urban workplaces.56 Inner-city neighborhoods are being torn apart
as sudden shifts of disinvestment and gentrification cause residents to flee due
to falling or rising housing prices.57 By separating to some extent the
exchange value and use value of the home, inclusionary zoning programs and
CLTs are facilitating and sustaining broader access to the stability, both social
51. In 2003, the American Dream Downpayment Act authorized federal use of HOME funds
for downpayment assistance. Salsich, Jr., supra note 50, at 504; Williams, supra note 50, at 475.
52. See BARRY G. JACOBS, HDR HANDBOOK OF HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT LAW, §§
4:72, 4:73 (2008).
53. JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP:
THE CHANGING
LANDSCAPE OF RESALE-RESTRICTED, OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING 55 (2006), http://www.burl
ingtonassociates.com/resources/archives/SharedEquityHome.pdf.
54. JACOBS, supra note 52, § 4:74 (discussing the amount of time required in home tied to
amount of money provided in subsidy).
55. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 80–81.
56. JESSE MINTZ-ROTH, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARVARD UNIV., LONG-TERM
AFFORDABLE HOUSING STRATEGIES IN HOT HOUSING MARKETS 3 (2008), http://www.nw.org/
network/pubs/catalog/documents/mintz-roth_fellowship_paper_05-08.pdf.
57. See James J. Kelly, Jr., Land Trusts that Conserve Communities, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009).
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and economic, that homeownership offers communities and their constituent
households.58
CLTs and most inclusionary zoning programs preserve the affordability of
stable homes indefinitely. They do so by keeping the subsidy that made the
home affordable in place at same location through multiple generations of
homeowners. Housing policy commentators have labeled this strongly placebased approach to subsidizing housing as subsidy retention.59 While it shares
many important features with other approaches to long-term housing subsidies,
subsidy retention can be best understood by examining how it differs from two
approaches to affordable housing protection: rent regulation and subsidy
recapture. Like subsidy retention, both are—or, at least, can be—long-term in
their approach to housing subsidy management. Rent-regulation maintains
place-based subsidy but does not deal with homeownership. Subsidy recapture
manages homeowner subsidies but does not necessarily maintain them in
place.
Basically, a homeownership subsidy retention device has two essential
features that together preserve the availability of a subsidized property to
future generations of eligible households. First, it preserves the subsidy for
continued investment in its original housing purpose, as opposed to allowing it
to be converted to the recipient’s unrestricted private use.60 Second, it
preserves that subsidy in-kind. That is, it ensures that, when the property is
resold, it will pass to another income-qualified household at a price that will be
affordable to those eligible homebuyers. Controlling the price will normally
require not only claiming the subsidy originally invested but also limiting the
equity appreciation—particularly, but not exclusively, the appreciation on the
subsidy portion of the home’s market value—to make sure the subsidized
homeowner’s investment gain does not put the property out of reach for the
next generation of qualifying homebuyers.
Rent regulation regimes such as New York City’s Rent Stabilization Code
may not seem to have anything in common with inclusionary zoning or CLT
programs. Tenants, including those whose tenure rights are enshrined in
statutes, are not homeowners in the typical sense. They do not build up equity
in their homes and generally cannot make alterations or improvements.61 On
the ‘home as place’ side of the ledger, however, the similarities between a feesimple single-family home in Fort Lee, New Jersey and a rent-stabilized twobedroom apartment across the river in Manhattan are striking. The statutory
tenant can look to the apartment as his or her home indefinitely without fear

58. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 61–62.
59. Id. at 80–81.
60. Id. at 81. This is also true of subsidy recapture mechanisms. Id. at 82.
61. FERN FISHER & ANDREW SCHERER, RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT LAW IN NEW
YORK § 8:79 (2008).
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that the landlord will simply not want to renew the lease. Lease renewals are
guaranteed by law, and the renewal rent increases are set by a local
administrative process based on landlord costs.62 Statutory tenants facing
eviction for nonpayment of rent are even afforded the same equity of
redemption that homeowners seek to preserve in foreclosure proceedings.63
Tenants can pass their leasehold rights onto family members who have shared
the apartment with them.64
If subsidy retention seeks stability of resident tenure, even across
generations, rent regulation provides a powerful example of how pricecontrolled housing can establish policies to promote it. On the stable creation
of wealth, however, rent regulation does not offer the same advantages as
homeownership, even equity-limited homeownership. While tenants are
entitled to savings account interest on their security deposits,65 there is no
significant investment steadily growing, by appreciation or loan amortization.
More importantly, the renter misses out on the federal income tax subsidy on
residential mortgage interest and property tax payments.66
The comparison between subsidy recapture and subsidy retention is more
straightforward. Both usually involve a stated formula by which the owner’s
return on his or her investment is calculated when he or she chooses to sell and
move on. The subsidy recapture provision may provide only for repayment of
the actual subsidy plus nominal interest, but it can also use the same mortgage
device to recoup some of the appreciation in market value during the
homeowner’s occupancy.67
The subsidy retention device invariably reserves for the subsidy provider a
portion of the appreciation in the homeowner’s monetary investment, but,
more significantly, it also keeps hold of the land. With respect to preserving
the economic diversity of certain blocks or neighborhoods, specific parcels of
land can be unique, even irreplaceable, goods. Even if a silent second
mortgage effectively recaptures the subsidy for those dedicated to preserving
affordability, there may be no opportunity to reinvest that money in the target
area. By recycling the financial assistance in place, programs using the
subsidy retention approach preserve footholds that earlier investments have
gained in communities that are otherwise becoming increasingly exclusive.

62. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.5(g) (2009); FISHER & SCHERER, supra
note 61, § 4:183.
63. 248 Sherman Avenue Corp. v. Coughlin, 222 N.Y.L.J. 13, 26 (1999).
64. § 2204.6(d) (discussing rent control succession); § 2523.5(b) (discussing rent
stabilization succession); FISHER & SCHERER, supra note 61, § 4:205.
65. FISHER & SCHERER, supra note 61, § 2:26.
66. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (West 2009); § 164(a)(1).
67. Aaron Lewis, Affordable Real Estate Transactions, 20 PROB. & PROP. 56, 59 (2006).
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Advocates of the subsidy retention device have shown how the maintenance of
these forward-looking investments can pay large dividends into the future.68
III. TWO APPROACHES TO RESALE RESTRICTIONS: LOCKBOX AND
STEWARDSHIP
In order to make subsidized homes available to future qualified
homebuyers, CLTs, inclusionary zoning programs and other affordability
measures, stewards must have the legal power to control the resale of the
property. Ultimately, to meet the goals of subsidy retention, the property must
end up in the hands of another income qualified household at a price that a
family can afford, and the system that assures this must be able to replicate this
result over the long-term.
What sets different types of subsidy retention mechanisms apart from
another, is not necessarily the apportionment of equity appreciation shared
with a homeowner and appreciation retained with the property. This crucial
policy decision can be made independently of the selection of the type of
subsidy retention device to be used.69 Instead, they are differentiated by how
they go about creating enforceable resale restrictions. The choice of how to
keep the subsidy—as opposed to, how much of the subsidy to keep—with the
land should be made in response to the current legal doctrines on alienability of
real property as well as be guided by the policy decisions that do, or at least
should, inform those doctrines.
A.

The Legal Challenges for Long-Term Resale Restrictions
1. Restraints on Alienation

Before classifying the overall approaches to resale restriction, our
discussion would benefit with a brief review of the conventional classification
of restraints on alienation. The placement of a particular resale restriction
mechanism within a specific category of alienation restraints may have
significant consequences for its enforceability.
There are three types of direct restraints on alienability: disabling,
forfeiture and promissory.70 All three straightforwardly prevent, or otherwise
limit, the ability of a parcel’s owners to sell it to others. A disabling restraint
acts with particular directness in preventing property transfers; it purports to
nullify all, or at least some, of the transfers made by the owner.71 A forfeiture
restraint, on the other hand, causes the owner to lose his interest in the property

68. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 81.
69. The ease, however, with which a resale formula can be changed once established, does
vary from one approach to another. See infra Part III.A.
70. LEWIS M. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 237 (2d ed. 1966).
71. Id.
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if he should try to sell or otherwise transfer, it.72 The forfeiture device could
be in the form of either a reversionary interest retained by the party that
imposed the condition as part of the original grant of title or a conditional grant
to a third party.73 While both disabling and forfeiture restraints act to nullify
violating grants to third parties, forfeiture provisions take the additional step of
providing for contingent future interests in the subject property.74 Both of
these blocks on alienability can be distinguished from an enforceable promise
not to transfer the property.
While the former two types of restraints use, or at least attempt to use, the
doctrines of real property law to prevent subsequent transfers by the grantee
that were objectionable in the eyes of the grantor, a promissory restraint uses
principles of contract law to establish an obligation of the grantee to the
grantor not to transfer the property in violation of the agreement.75 Since such
a contractual promise involves unique property, the remedies for breach may
include specific performance as well as money damages.76 Also, a promise
that meets all the doctrinal requisites of covenants or equitable servitudes may
‘run with the land’ and thereby be enforceable against subsequent owners of
the property.77
Some agreements governing the right to sell restrain alienation less directly
or less completely. A right of first refusal, for instance, may require an owner
subject to it to take any offer to purchase his or her property to the holder of
the right and afford them some opportunity to match the price in the offer.78
Unless the time period for exercising the preemptive option is exceedingly
long, most courts would not see this contractual arrangement as any significant
restraint on the owner’s ability to sell his or her land. The ordinary right of
first refusal may well limit to whom the property will be transferred, but not
the price or time at which it will be sold.79 As discussed below, if the
preemptive right of purchase sets an option price that will require the owner to
forego more attractive market-rate offers, then the preemptive option may be
judged, and possibly invalidated, under the same criteria applied to direct

72. Id. at 238.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 279 (Both types of forfeiture restraints create future interests conditioned on the
grantee’s failure to comply with the restraint on alienation. The contingent future interest given
to the third party is generally subject to the RAP. The reversionary interest retained by the
grantor is not the kind of future interest subject to RAP analysis.).
75. SIMES, supra note 70, at 238, 248.
76. Id. at 248.
77. Id.
78. Cf. Bernard Daskal, Note, Rights of First Refusal and the Package Deal, 22 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 461, 461–62 (1995).
79. Id.
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restraints on alienation.80 For the most part, these distinctions among the
mechanisms by which alienation restraints act to prevent certain transfers
affect but ultimately do not determine their enforceability under the common
law doctrine against unreasonable restraints on alienation.
In general, the validity of restraints on alienation is determined by
reference to four factors.81 First, courts are somewhat more likely to enforce
alienation restraints imposed by those using them to protect an interest in
land.82 Second, the reasonability of a restraint on alienation will often depend
on the duration of the restraint.83 Third, courts will look to the underlying
purpose of the alienability restraint and weigh its importance against the
general public policy favoring unfettered alienability of interests in land.84
Fourth, the severity of the restraint will be measured by the probability of it
preventing likely transfers.85
In addition to these common law standards that strike a balance between
alienability and competing goals, there are two types of statutes that express a
similar legal hostility toward prior restraint on the marketability of land. Many
states also have statutory protections that ban outright those legal arrangements
that completely deprive a landowner of the ability to transfer the property.86
Another common-law doctrine, often codified in statute, creates an absolute
bar on future interests that may interfere with alienation far into the future. It
is this fixture of law, the RAP, that merits our attention now.
2. Perpetuities
Resale restriction devices face another legal obstacle if they create what
the law calls perpetuities. Perpetuities are contingent future interests in
property that may remain subject to contingencies far into the future.87 The
RAP establishes a period of time, usually the span of a life in being at the time
of the creation of the interest plus an additional 21 years, against which the
remoteness of the vesting of the future interest must be judged.88 In the
standard formulation of the Rule, if a contingent future interest may still be ‘up
in the air’ at the end of the prescribed perpetuities period, than the future
interest is void.89

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 406 (1944) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 80, § 406.
SIMES, supra note 70, at 264.
Id. at 263.
Dukeminier, supra note 19, at 1868.
SIMES, supra note 70, at 263.
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Both the RAP and the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation
promote the unfettered marketability of property. Contingent future interests
created by conditional grants, on the other hand, can create uncertainty in title
that go beyond restraints on alienation. One court has found that a right of first
refusal can violate the RAP even if it does not present any burden on the
alienability of the property.90 For the most part, however, these two doctrines
have taken different approaches toward the same goal, making land available
for voluntary transfer.
The rule against unreasonable restraints of alienation impacts a broad
variety of the types of direct and, sometimes, indirection alienability restraints
described above.91 The RAP, on the other hand, impacts only those alienation
restraints that create contingent future interests.92 Thus, disabling restraints,
which may be judged with particular severity against general alienability
doctrines, do not pose any perpetuities problems because they do not, as
disabling restraints, involve creating new future interests in land. The
inclusion in a resale restriction mechanism of forfeiture restraints, however,
does warrant awareness of the RAP.
It might appear that any forfeiture provision that could deprive an owner of
title at any point in time in the future would violate the Rule, in its basic form.
The Rule, however, has been interpreted to limit different types of forfeiture
restraints in different ways. A restraint that purports to transfer ownership of
the property to a third party in the event that the owner attempts to alienate his
or her interest will be subjected to scrutiny under the Rule.93 Reversionary
interests back to the original grantor that imposed the condition, however, are
generally not considered to be future interests within the scope of the RAP.94
Nevertheless, option contracts have been found to be subject to the RAP even
when the option to purchase is held by the grantor.95 This, then, raises the
question as to how indirect restraints, such as the preemptive option, should be
treated under the RAP, especially when the holder of the option was the prior
owner of the property.96

90. Ferrero Constr. v. Dennis Rourke Corp., 536 A.2d 1137, 1142–43 (Md. 1988).
91. SIMES, supra note 70, at 269.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 279.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 281; Dukeminier, supra note 19, at 1908.
96. Preemptive options contained within leases and governance documents receive more
favorable treatment as restraints on alienation and as possible perpetuities. Thus, the modern
development of these doctrines will remain relevant to discussion not only of the preemptive
option generally but the different legal contexts in which such an option arrangement might be
created. See infra Part IV.
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The Approaches to Long-Term Resale Restrictions

The doctrines curbing restraints on alienation all express certain policy
goals aimed at making the property more available to the market. Subsidy
retention focuses on segregating certain parcels of land from the conventional
real estate market. It does not follow, however, that every type of resale
restriction conflicts with these rules favoring alienability in the same way.
Moreover, attempts by permanent affordability advocates to accommodate
legal alienability protections need not diminish the effectiveness of the subsidy
retention programs they create. Instead, an approach to conserving affordable
homeownership over the long term should not merely evade the technical
pitfalls created by these old rules but should engage the policy justifications
behind them to increase the effectiveness of permanent affordability programs.
Resale restrictions take three different legal modes of constraining behavior. I
will refer to these, in turn, as “Private Resale Lockbox,” “Public Resale
Lockbox” and “Stewardship.”
1. Private Resale Lockbox—Limited Title
Since the subsidy retention approach to housing affordability is essentially
an attempt to conserve land indefinitely for affordable homeownership, it is
natural to look to the wilderness conservation movement for models as to how
to secure the preservation over time. The perpetual conservation easement
offers the best example of a legal device that can be used to permanently, and
almost irrevocably, sever development rights from ownership rights. A
donated conservation easement places the rights to “improve,” or otherwise
disturb, pristine natural land into a trust, the heads of which are legally charged
to make sure that the land is never developed.97 With other in-kind goods
donated to other charities, charitable organization directors can decide to
dispose of donated valuables as they believe will best meet the organization’s
service goals.98 But conservation trust managers, under Internal Revenue
Service regulations, have no power to trade or otherwise liquidate their
easement assets for other goods, including other easements, that they judge to
be more valuable to their overall mission.99 The irrevocability of the donation
of a perpetual conservation easement expresses the idea of natural conservation
as an unquestionable, almost eternal, good. Some commentators have
questioned the lack of flexibility in conservation easements and recommended

97. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 439 (2005); Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of
Private Conservation Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public
Land Use Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1039, 1044–45 (2007).
98. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 187 (9th ed. 2007).
99. A conservation easement can be transferred only from one qualified steward to another.
26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(c)(2) (2008).
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doctrines that facilitate appropriate modification.100 Some advocates of
conservation, however, have fought for the development of the conservation
mechanism101 precisely because of its resistance to any accommodation or
compromise. The idea of a lockbox102 is designed to address certain goods
against apparently irresistible forces. By forever placing the legal power to
develop a particular parcel of land, three parties—the property owner, the
nonprofit land trust and the Internal Revenue Service—are making a resource
allocation decision that will bind all future generations.
In the context of affordable housing, it may seem tempting to claim that
the same market forces that lead to the exploitation and permanent loss of
wilderness inevitably threaten and overcome well-intentioned plans to create
affordable housing. Even if a “lockbox” can be appropriate for the
conservation of natural areas, or even farmland, there are at least two
differences that set the preservation of affordable homeownership apart. First,
the geographic context in which affordable homeownership operates is much
more subject to change than the idyllic settings that make conservation
easements relevant.103 As important as housing and its affordability are in
general, the irreversible decision to dedicate land to that particular purpose
presupposes a foresight that the constantly shifting metropolitan reality does
not permit. Second, the conservation world has been able to sever the
problematic development rights from the rest of the bundle of sticks without
interfering with the transferability of those other aspects of title. Affordable
homeownership involves not only a particular land use but also dictates the
price of transfer and the economic characteristics of appropriate buyers. The
creation of a limited estate in which the homeowner can transfer the property
only to certain persons bears some similarities to the fee tail arrangement. The
need to pass affordable homeownership opportunities to qualified households
at an affordable price does not lend itself to a “set-it-and-forget-it” approach to
stewardship.104
In reality, the limited title approach to perpetually affordable
homeownership has not been widely adopted. In its simplest form, the

100. McLaughlin, supra note 97, at 424–25; Korngold, supra note 97, at 1042–43.
101. The common law does not support the enforceability of servitudes in gross. Most
conservation easements rely on state statutes based on the Model Conservation Easement Act
developed in the early 1980’s.
102. The term “lockbox” was used by then Vice-President Al Gore during his presidential
campaign to describe his solution for ensuring the viability of the Social Security system.
Governor George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore Participate in Presidential Debate
Commission Debate (Oct. 3, 2000), 2000 WL 1466168 (F.D.C.H.) (corrected copy).
103. See Carol M. Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments on Professors
French and Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403, 1413–14 (1982); Stewart E. Sterk, Foresight
and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 966 (1988).
104. Cf. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 69–70.
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affordable homeowner “lockbox” could involve a deed restriction that imposes
a disabling or forfeiture restraint on the abilities of the homeowner both to sell
to anyone at a price higher than the amount set in the resale cap formula and to
transfer title to any household that did not meet a certain economic profile. Of
all the affordability approaches considered in this Article, the doctrines against
unreasonable restraint on alienation would be most severe on such a direct
assault on the homeowner’s ability to transfer, especially when the party
imposing the restriction might not have any continuing relationship the land,
the homeowner, or future buyers whom might themselves subject to the same
conditions.105
2. Public Resale Lockbox—Command and Control Regulation
For the most part, the law’s hostility toward alienation restraints and
perpetuities appears in the common law and statutes.106 The RAP appears in
several state constitutions, but a general prohibition against alienation
restraints is not usually found at the constitutional level.107 Thus, one possible
solution to securing the affordability of subsidized homes indefinitely might be
to enact a law at the state level that governs the resales of the properties subject
to it.108 Although the conservation land trust movement has also embraced this
command-and-control approach, the strongest example comes from the world
of affordable housing. Rent regulation systems take a strong command and
control approach to preserving affordability in private rental markets.
New York’s twin systems of rent regulation show how command-andcontrol systems can regulate affordability. Rent stabilization is a lease-based
approach to statutory tenancies.109 Landlords and tenants in buildings subject
to the Rent Stabilization Law and Code set the specific terms of their tenancies
subject to certain generic tenant protection laws.110 The Rent Stabilization
Code focuses primarily on capping the maximum rent that can be charge for
the regulated unit. Legal rents are determined by the unit’s rent history as
affected by the guideline and other rent increases that the rent stabilization

105. See infra Part III.B.2.
106. See SIMES, supra note 70, at 237.
107. But see, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, § 19 (elevating the RAP to the constitutional level);
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34 (elevating the RAP to the constitutional level); OKLA. CONST. art. II, §
32; N.M. CONST. art. IV §§ 26, 38 (elevating the RAP to the constitutional level). See also DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503 (2009) (RAP does not apply to wills and trusts); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
46:2F-9 (West 2003) (abolishing the RAP); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-6-3 (2004) (abolished the
RAP); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-1522 (2007) (abolishing the RAP).
108. The Maryland General Assembly is currently considering legislation that would do just
this.
109. See infra notes 111–14.
110. These laws are not different in kind from those in cities without rent regulation. FISHER
& SCHERER, supra note 61, § 4:1.
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administrative apparatus has sanctioned.111 Unlike the long-term affordable
homeownership programs, the rent stabilization system does not require that
protected tenants fall within a narrow range of household incomes.112 The Rent
Stabilization Law and Code devote a considerable amount of attention,
however, to ensuring that the law protects only those tenants who maintain
their units as their primary residences.113 Even though tenants are provided
with access to information to help them enforce the rent caps and landlords are
motivated to enforce primary residence restrictions by rent increase
opportunities occasioned by tenant turnover, the rent regulation system in New
York requires a vast and expensive bureaucracy that can be justified by the
large percentage of New York City’s housing that is subject to it.
In the context of permanently affordable homeownership, it is difficult to
see how a one-size-fits-all system could be developed at the state level that
would directly restrict resales of subsidized homes. Most commentators who
have advocated for statutory change in this area have focused on laws that
provide some assurance that the private arrangements made between
subsidized homeowner and sponsor are properly regulated and enforced.114
Even when the statutes that sanction the enforceability of affordable housing
resale restrictions also provide local governments with the authority to impose
the terms through regulation rather than more private means, local programs
have tended to rely on a hybrid form of land use control such as the statutory
community association.
3. Resale Stewardship: The Preemptive Option
Thus far, we have considered, in turn, an indelible restriction created by a
single grantor and a regulatory scheme imposed by the state or local
government or both. The first option simply defies the existing doctrines
regarding perpetuities and restraints on alienation and is, therefore, vulnerable

111. Id. § 4:99.
112. A change in the Rent Stabilization Law permits landlords to charge market rents in
excess of the legal rent to those tenants whose household income exceeds $175,000 per year and
whose regulated rents already exceed $2,000 per month. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-504.1. This
deregulation provision is not the same as one requiring a landlord to rent a stabilized unit to a
household with an income below that level.
113. Failure to maintain a rent stabilized apartment can be grounds for eviction or nonrenewal of the lease. FISHER & SCHERER, supra note 61, § 8:206. Subleasing is strictly limited.
Id. § 8:162.
114. See, e.g., Christopher A. Seeger, Note, The Fixed-Price Preemptive Right in the CLT
Lease: A Valid Response to the Housing Crisis or an Invalid Restraint on Alienation?, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 471 (1989). But see, e.g., Ngai Pindell, Fear and Loathing: Combating
Speculation in Local Communities, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 543, 546 (2006) (proposing zoning
ordinance amendment that severely restricts resale of residential property for first three years of
ownership).
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to judicial invalidation.
The command-and-control approach, already
dependent on statutory enactment, enjoys the ability to simply trump the
doctrines that make structuring the conservation of affordable homeownership
so challenging. An alternative approach to resale control, however, may
accommodate these market-oriented real estate doctrines and produce legal
devices for preserving homeownership subsidies in place that are direct, clear
and legally enforceable.
Rather than privately or publicly deprive the homeowner of the permanent
ability to sell his or her home on the open market to the highest bidder, legal
arrangements can be made at the time of the original home purchase to ensure
that an entity committed to preserving the affordability of the property has the
option of buying the home at a calculated resale price and insuring its transfer
to a qualified buyer. This option on the property could be exercised only when
the homeowner declares his or her intent to move from or sell the property.115
Like a right of first refusal, it gives the stewardship entity the right to obtain
the property when the owner is ready to sell. Because the price is set by a
formula already agreed to by the stewardship entity and the homeowner, the
stewardship’s right to purchase is called a preemptive option.
C. Why Stewardship is the Better Approach to Resale Restrictions
Under the preemptive option approach to restricting resale, the only
obstacle to full and free alienability depends on the affirmative action of the
stewardship entity. Generally, the period of time that the owner must wait to
allow the option to be exercised is limited.116 From a process point of view,
the burden on alienability is strictly limited.
Depending on the legal vehicle for the preemptive option, the stewardship
entity has an ongoing relationship with the land. For options held by
homeowners’ associations and cooperatives, the link exists by way of the other
members’ interests in adjoining real property. The CLT employing a ground
lease has a direct reversionary interest in the land itself. Courts hostile to
alienation restraints held in gross can be assured that enforcement of these
types of resale restrictions protect the steward’s ongoing interest in the
property itself.117
Those qualities that make the preemptive option attractive to courts and
policy makers suspicious of dead hand control also require the stewardship
entity to function as an attentive and committed guardian of affordability and
other social values. If the land trust or community association manager does
not respond to a homeowner’s notice of intent to sell in a timely manner, the
115. INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., supra note 18, at 12-13.
116. Under the Revised Model Ground Lease, the CLT has 45 days from the receipt of the
appraisal to exercise its option or the option expires. Id.
117. Id.
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homeowner may be free of the subsidy retention, if not subsidy recapture,
devices affecting resale.118 Given the fact that small community-based
nonprofits perennially face financial challenges, the possibility that the
stewardship might become dormant or cease to exist altogether must be
considered when planning a resale stewardship system.
The conservation movement has been drawn to the lockbox approach for
protecting wilderness areas because they fear that vacillating political fortunes,
in public and even private nonprofit land trusts, may lead to retractions of
conservation commitments. By securing an irreversible easement grant from
the landowner, the conservation land trust appears to have eliminated the
possibility that the land will ever be developed.119 For those who see the
preservation of wilderness as an immutable good, the certainty of truly
permanent dedication of land seems very attractive.
Those dedicated to the availability of affordable homes may be no less
passionate about the rightness of their cause. Like environmental activists,
they often see themselves standing against powerful institutions, both private
and public, focused on market-generated gains.
Because residential
affordability in neighborhoods requires constant attention, those committed to
permanent affordability in housing hopefully recognize that a simplistic
banning of all future market sales cannot guarantee the property remains a safe,
decent and affordable home.120 Even if a stewardship relationship is supported
by broader, self-executing curbs on the subsidized homeowner’s ability to sell
on the open market, the need for an active steward that manages the need for
change and monitors compliance cannot be ignored.121 Despite the fact that
the stewardship approach to resale restrictions places the responsibility of
protecting the ongoing affordability of the subsidized home on a single entity,
it is better suited to the dynamics of residential real estate markets than the
lockbox approach.

118. For this reason, it may be prudent for those community developers employing the
preemptive option as the subsidy retention device to backstop it with a subsidy recapture
mechanism such as a silent second mortgage. This seemingly redundant structuring may take
away any financial incentive the homeowner might have to evade or challenge his or her
obligation to sell the property back to the stewardship entity.
119. I say “apparently” because there remains the prospect that the easement could be
condemned in eminent domain proceedings. See generally McLaughlin, supra note 97.
120. See id. and accompanying text.
121. Given the possibility of stewardship organizational failure, pre-emptive options should
be created to allow them to be exercised by back-up stewards, such as local housing agencies, in
the event that the primary steward is unable to exercise them.
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IV. STEWARDSHIP FORMS: THE PREEMPTIVE OPTION IN GROUND LEASES AND
COVENANTS
The defined-price right of first refusal is the heart of the stewardship
approach to retaining homeownership subsidies in place over the long-term.
The choice of the pre-emptive option as the mechanism by which resale
controls are actualized already gives the stewardship approach meaningful
definition. There are, however, several options as to how this particular
promise by the homeowner to the stewardship entity can be memorialized.
CLTs have made the preemptive option one of many provisions unique to the
ground lease that establishes the relationship between a CLT and the supported
homeowner. Inclusionary zoning programs have taken advantage of the fact
that their affordable units are created as part of a new housing development
complete with its own set of covenants and community governance
mechanism. In addition to these two examples of long-term affordability
stewardship relationships, there exists the possibility of the affordability
promise existing as a stand-alone covenant between a fee simple homeowner
and a stewardship entity that has no other direct relationship to the property
protected.
A.

Preemptive Options in CLT Ground Leases

Although ground leases are rarely used for small residential properties in
most states,122 commercial ground leases have become indispensable in the
development of shopping centers and malls.123 They have not only facilitated
the financing of large projects created and monitored by specialized business
enterprises, but they have also maintained the necessary coordination of
investment among large and small retailers through alienability restrictions.124
Even though commercial ground leasing focused more completely on the free
market, anchor tenant leases that severely restrict the ability of these big-name
retailers to assign or sublet their space to lesser stores are essential to building
confidence in the community of smaller, satellite tenants by which a mall
developer makes the bulk of its profits. Although theoretically, a shopping

122. Maryland has a long history of ground leasing on single-family homes. While
Pennsylvania and Maryland both used ground leases through the 19th century, diverging legal
treatment of the reversionary interests caused Pennsylvania’s system to fade while Maryland’s
ground rent system became an important feature in the development of Baltimore’s turn-of-thecentury rowhouses. In 1884, Maryland adopted a statutory measure that made ground leases on
single-family homes redeemable, essentially relegating them to a financing device that could be
fully amortized. MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 8-110 (West 2009). This has created unique
challenges for using the ground lease mechanism to try to use ground leases to create perpetually
affordable homeownership in Maryland.
123. See JEROME D. WHALEN, COMMERCIAL GROUND LEASES § 1:2 (2010).
124. See id.
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center could be developed by granting full title for each store space to the
retailer occupying it and using reciprocal covenants to manage the positive and
negative spillover effects, the ground lease provides the flexibility and
certainty of enforcement that is necessary to maintaining the community of
businesses.
In the context of permanently affordable homes, the CLT movement has
championed the use of the ground lease for a variety of reasons. Explaining
that the home is not just as a “bundle of rights” but also a “bundle of values,”
the CLT Legal Manual posits that the CLT approach of separating ownership
of land and ownership of the improvements reflects the reality that while the
homeowner is responsible for the value of his property to the extent it is
impacted by the quality of the house on it, much of the owner’s equity depends
on the desirability of the surrounding community as a place to live. By giving
the homeowner full title to the house while retaining a reversionary interest in
the land beneath it, CLT proponents argue that they are restoring the natural
balance of the private and communal values in the home.125
CLT ground leases generally provide for a 99-year term, with at least one
renewal at the option of the homeowner.126 Although the land trust
homeowner does not have fee simple title to the land, the idea of the ground
lease is to give the homeowner the same security of tenure that other
homeowners enjoy. The lease arrangement departs from fee simple transfers
in the two areas that are critical to subsidy retention. During the term of the
lease, a leaseholder homeowner must commit to maintaining the property as
his or her primary residence. When the homeowner decides to move, the
preemptive option on the improvements is triggered. Nothing in the lease
prevents leaseholder homeowners from staying in their homes as long as they
wish.127
These core requirements of primary residence commitment and resale
restriction are common to all subsidy retention structures. Differentiating the
leasehold approach from the uses of covenants, therefore, involves three other
areas: the differences to enforcement of resale restrictions; the differences in
term-time questions such as property tax treatment and responses to nuisance
and waste; and the consequences of the form choice for the goods associated
with homeownership.
125. See generally Kirby White & Charles Matthei, Community Land Trusts, in BEYOND THE
MARKET AND THE STATE: NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 41 (Severyn T.
Bruyn & James Meehan eds., 1987).
126. Leases that provide for fixed terms that exceed 99-years are considered fee, rather than
leasehold, transfers. Leases, both commercial and residential, that provide for very long-terms
must be carefully structured to avoid recharacterization as mortgages or other financing devices.
See Frank Lyon Co. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
127. Leasehold interests are generally inheritable pursuant to the terms of the lease. INST. FOR
CMTY. ECON., supra note 18, at 12-12.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

HOMES AFFORDABLE FOR GOOD

35

The stewardship approach generally has shown greater compatibility with
existing law than the lockbox approach. Focusing on the enforceability,
unassisted by statutory reform, of the preemptive option, the land trust ground
lease also has advantages to recommend itself. As noted earlier, preemptive
options acquired by transferors of the property are increasingly exempted from
being subjected to the RAP.128 Likewise, the leasehold preemptive option
offers compliance advantages with regard to the rule against unreasonable
restraints on alienation. The CLT’s reversion creates the strongest stewardship
relationship for restricting resales. Because the land belongs to the land trust, a
long-term, set-price right of first refusal on the improvements on that land
seems quite reasonable to courts reviewing alienation restraints.129 The fact
that the public purpose behind the resale restrictions is to preserve affordable
housing strengthens the enforceability of the option once the perpetuities
concern has been eliminated.
Because all affordability stewards wish to ensure that the property is kept
in good condition, it is essential that the homeownership arrangement
facilitates this goal. In market-based owner-occupied home situations, the
homeowner has strong financial incentives to maintain the property in good
order to maximize his or her financial return upon resale. CLTs can also
structure the resale to provide this financial incentive for diligent maintenance,
but they generally rely upon appraisals, rather than arms-length buyers, to
judge the quality of the care. To prevent serious waste during the term, CLTs
have a power to intervene that is unavailable to other kinds of affordability
stewards.130 Hopefully, neither this advantage, nor an enhanced ability to
respond to a homeowner’s nuisance activity, will be significantly important to
a perpetually affordable homeownership program that screens homebuyers and
appropriately aligns incentives, but the leasehold arrangement cannot be
matched for the potential for active stewardship.131
The same effective leasehold CLT remedies for homeowner defaults,
however, can contribute to a view of the leasehold homeowner as having a
tenant rather than an owner-occupant status. Recalling the goods associated
with homeownership, we see that some were associated with the house as an
investment and others with the home as a stable place within a community.
The details of the resale formula, rather than the form of the resale restriction,
determine the extent to which the subsidized homeowner receives the same
return that a market homebuyer would. The extent to which the leasehold

128. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 27 and 78.
130. INST. FOR CMTY. ECON., supra note 18, at 12-10.
131. This ability to quickly respond to homeowner default may prove more useful to the core
affordability mission in dealing with disputes over primary residency.
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arrangement itself detracts from a CLT homeowner’s status is harder to
identify.
B.

Preemptive Option in Reciprocal Covenants and Organizational Bylaws

Although actual long-term affordability programs have aspects to their
programs that draw upon the previous two approaches, the third and fourth
types of resale restrictions predominate in current long-term subsidy retention
programs in the United States. Maryland’s Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit
(MPDU) programs have favored the use of community association covenant
declarations as the vehicles for establishing restrictions.132 As one of the
earliest, and still leading, examples of inclusionary zoning in the United States,
the MPDU program of Montgomery County creates subsidized affordable
homes through large and medium-sized residential developments that are
required by law to set aside units as affordable homeownership
opportunities.133 The nature of these developments presupposes the creation of
a statutory homeowners’ association and the declaration of covenants
governing land use within the development. The MPDU program has used this
legal framework to establish the resale restrictions governing the subsidized
homes within the development.
Even though these affordable units are properly thought of as single-family
homes owned in fee, the limited-equity housing cooperative in many ways
serves as the model for this approach in which reciprocal covenants of
affordability are imposed from the inception of the development.134 As with
MPDU-regulated developments, apartment buildings developed as limitedequity coops involve multiple units, some or all of which are income-restricted
and placed in service more or less simultaneously.135 The resale restrictions
generally appear in the cooperative members’ proprietary leases, their stock
certificates and the bylaws of the cooperative.136 The enforcement of these
affordability protections falls to the cooperative board. With both limitedequity cooperatives and MPDU developments, however, there are actually two
sets of enforcers for the resale restrictions.
Once a MPDU declaration has been recorded, the community association
has the ability to enforce the affordability covenants.137 The covenants

132. Moderately Priced Dwelling Units, supra note 27.
133. Orfield, supra note 9, at 914–15.
134. See Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a
Race and Class Divided Society, 46 HOW. L.J. 85, 87 (2002).
135. Id. at 86.
136. David H. Kirkpatrick, Cooperatives and Mutual Housing Associations, 1 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 7, 7 (1992).
137. See Moderately Priced Dwelling Units, supra note 27.
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authorize the local housing agency to enforce the resale provisions.138
Likewise, cooperatives are primarily responsible for implementing their own
resale restrictions, but they are frequently contractually obligated to preserve
These guarantees often appear in the financing
affordability also.139
arrangements the cooperative makes to secure its blanket mortgage.140 Both
these systems envision affordability limitations as reciprocal arrangements like
use restrictions. In each case, however, the original sponsors of the subsidized
housing do not pretend that the community of homeowners will have the same
motivation to enforce the affordability commitments as they do when
regulating permitted uses.
The fundamental enforcement structures in both the cooperative and
community association contexts provide strong resistance to invalidation under
traditional rules against alienability restraints. As residents and decisionmakers in a corporate landlord, cooperative members have been given broad
latitude to constrain each other’s abilities to sell their shares. In the less
intimate homeowners’ association context, the interdependence of land uses
also supports reasonable restraints on alienation.141 Despite the double-layer
enforcement system, the fundamental orientation of the alienability restraints
toward the interests of the other community stakeholders masks the “in gross”
nature of the alienability restriction held by the outside entity committed to
long-term affordability.
The MPDU resale restrictions offer another structural accommodation to
the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation. The duration of even the
longest resale control periods does not exceed thirty years.142 The covenants
used by the Frederick County MPDU program provide for a single fifteen-year
control period starting with a unit’s initial sale.143 The Montgomery County
program, on the other hand, not only provides for a thirty-year resale control
period but also for the restarting of the thirty-year clock every time a unit is
resold within its control period.144 Even though this latter approach has the
very real potential of keeping most units permanently affordable, the MPDU
approach to the declaration of affordability covenants supplies a date certain

138. The local housing agency is also empowered to enforce these restrictions through the
local ordinance. Although these restrictions run only for the first 30 years of the unit’s existence,
this dual protection can be seen as a preemptive option arrangement backed up by a public resale
lockbox, albeit a time-limited dedication. Id.
139. Kirkpatrick, supra note 134, at 7.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Moderately Priced Dwelling Units, supra note 29.
143. Id. art. III.
144. Id. art. II.
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for the termination of the covenant for each buyer. This defined time limit
speaks directly to the second of the Restatement’s four factors.145
By taking full advantage of the homeowners’ association structure created
as part of the inclusionary development, the MPDU program creates a
partnership relationship to steward the economic diversity of the community.
Unlike the rent regulation scenario, in which the landlord and tenant each have
financial incentives to police compliance with different aspects of the
affordability preservation rules, the community association steward has the
relationship to the land but lacks a clear motivation for vigilant oversight of
resales by the residents of the affordable homeownership units. The approach
taken by the CLT movement is essentially to give the genuine steward of
affordability a direct and ongoing relationship to the land.146 The ability to
mix in affordability in existing single-family home neighborhoods requires not
only subsidy retention but also devices that do not depend on
contemporaneously created community governance.
C. Preemptive Option in Stand-Alone Covenants
Even though the inclusionary zoning covenant offers homeowners fee title
of both land and house without sacrificing perpetual affordability, the
reciprocal covenant option is not as viable for single-family homes developed
in existing neighborhoods in terms of enforceability. Vermont, a leader in the
development of CLTs, has framed a statutory alternative to ground leasing for
controlling resale of subsidized single-family homes. Pursuant to a law passed
in 1989, nonprofit developers of subsidized housing can sell properties to
qualified homebuyers and subject them to housing subsidy covenants.147
Although the model covenant in actual use provides for a preemptive option to
purchase, the statute clears away all impediments to the enforceability of any
kind of resale restriction imposed by a qualifying developer for the purpose of
preserving affordability. Interestingly, the Central Vermont CLT, when
offered the opportunity to take a fully enforceable lockbox approach to
perpetually affordable homeownership still opted for the active stewardship

145. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
146. Several urban CLTs – New Columbia CLT in Washington, DC (http://www.cdsc.org/
ncclt/), the Rehabilitation Action to Improve Neighborhoods (RAIN) CLT in New York City, and
the San Francisco CLT (http://www.sfclt.org/) – are preserving affordability through cooperative
structures. Essentially, the cooperative keeps the individual apartments affordable and the
community land trust ensures that the cooperative maintains its commitment to affordability,
usually through a ground lease.
147. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 610 (2009).
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model more compatible with the legal doctrines protecting freedom of
alienability.148
Although the statutorily prescribed stand-alone perpetual covenant would
appear to be the perfect lockbox vehicle for permanently dedicating land to
affordable homeownership, the recognition of the need for ongoing monitoring
of the resale process has brought even this affordability protection device into
the affordability stewardship fold. As a leading commentator on shared equity
homeownership has observed, a passive attempt to create a self-enforcing
affordability restriction “can be a recipe for disaster.”149 This Article has
focused on how the law related to the enforceability of such affordability
restrictions has encouraged an active and ongoing relationship between the
affordability steward and the land. Other concerns, such as the compatibility
of affordability restrictions with lender requirements, are beyond the scope of
the current discussion but also support the need for a vigilant and sophisticated
stewardship agent. As the need for economic diversity among homeowners in
localities receives greater attention, advocates and policy makers alike will
hopefully recognize the importance of viable stewardship arrangements that
sustain perpetually affordable homeownership.

148. For information about the Central Vermont Community Land Trust’s Homeland Grant
program, see Central Vermont Community Land Trust, Grants, http://www.cvclt.org/grants.html
(last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
149. Davis, supra note 53, at 70.
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